Abstract: On the study of the central-local government relationship in China, a theoretical perspective has been proposed based on the inherent contradictions of authoritarian regime to explore the coping mechanism as well as the model and the logic of state governance caused by such contradictions. However, this perspective ignores the “tiao-kuai” system, an important part of the central-local government relationship, and fails to include it in its theoretical analysis. Thus, the question of whether these inherent contradictions can explain the formation and evolution of the tiao-kuai system remains unanswered.
In order to establish a broader theoretical framework that includes an analysis of the tiao-kuai relationship, this paper examines the conflicts in the process of building up multiple-dimension state governance capacities. The theoretical starting point of this investigation is that regime stability and strong ruling power are the primary goal of the central government. Hence, it becomes a necessity for the central state to develop multi-dimension capacities in political control, resource extraction, economic development and public affairs management. Accordingly, subordinate government agencies (central ministries and local governments) are required to implement the tasks. However, developing these multiple capacities involve in conflicts, manifested in strengthening one capacity may weaken the others. This paper argues that the tiao-kuai system was introduced by the central government as a strategy to control such conflicts. It enables the central government to develop multiple capacities while reducing the conflicts that exist in the process. The empirical evidences presented here show that this argument is supported by the evolution of the tiao-kuai relationship in modern China and therefore, to some extent, reveals the mechanism of its formation and evolution.

Key words: authoritarian regime, tiao-kuai relationship, state capacity construction