Chinese Journal of Sociology ›› 2009, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 24-51.

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Embedded Games and the Supply Structure of Public Goods： A Case of Village

 WANG Shui-Xiong   

  • Online:2009-05-20 Published:2009-05-20

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Abstract:

The government and market are usually thought of as the two major providers of public goods. However， behind them are the two fundamental logics： the technological logic and the institutional logic. These two logics are usually interwoven. The government and social mechanisms are typically dependent upon the institutional logic， which differs from the governmental factors. Within the institutional logic， “social factors” can open up varying possibilities for the supply of public goods. Embedded games serve as the core mechanism derived from the various factors organized by the institutional logic. This mechanism presents itself in different models as a function of different internal and external organizational and interpersonal relationships， such as the patronizing model， pigs’ payoffs model， and correlated game model. The supply of public goods in the rural areas has rarely been examined from the villagers’ perspective in research; therefore， the aforementioned mechanism is hard to be shown clearly. Based on the observations of the bridge building/repairing and the drinking water projects in Village Wang， this paper has clearly revealed this structural issue in the public goods supply in the rural areas of current China. This topic can also lead to a discussion about the market and social issues.

Key words: embedded games, institutional logic, supply of public goods, technological logic, collective bargaining  , internal state mechanism  , employeremployee relationships  , trade union