Chinese Journal of Sociology ›› 2009, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 1-20.

• Articles •     Next Articles

The Reverse Order in Paying off Workers by Contractors in the Chinese Construction Industry：For Whom Is the Market Risk Reduced by “Guanxi”?

 CAI He, JIA Wen-Juan   

  • Online:2009-09-20 Published:2009-09-20

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Abstract:

 In the construction industry， when a project is short of funds to pay off all the workers， the contractors will follow a reverse order， namely， paying off the peripheral workers to whom they are not personally close before paying off the core workers with whom they have close relationships. Such a pattern is due to “Guanxi’s” inability to reduce “the environmental uncertainty” despite of the possibility for “Guanxi” to lower the uncertainty in the trading parties. Once the environmental uncertainty directly threatens the interests of the parties in a “Guanxi，” the inherent tension within the “Guanxi” will intensify and conflicts will surface. Contractors would rather take the risk of the behavioral uncertainty of losing their core workers in order to minimize the probable threat from the peripheral workers. Nevertheless， when the contractors combine their hiring power with the law of relational favorism， the result is a kind of “Guanxi hegemony” which can restrict the core workers’ behavioral uncertainty. “Guanxi’s” function in regulating market risks to unequal levels for the contractors and the core workers， with the former benefited from reduced risks but the latter to shoulder higher risks.

Key words:

Regional Community , Cultural Type, International Conference, Summary

, contractors, “Guanxi” , pay, power