Abstract: Private entrepreneurs play an invisible but more and more influential role in Chinese political life. Therefore, more studies on governmentbusiness relations become necessary for better understanding of the political development in contemporary China. With the theoretical presumption of “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”, existing researches explore whether there is an autonomous and opposite capitalist class in the process of market transition, and most of them conclude that the capitalist class in China is quite dependent on and colludes with the state because of their shared political values and interests as well as the political cooptation and corporatism of the Partystate. Some other studies reflect on these viewpoints and contend that it’s improper to consider the private entrepreneurs as a homogeneous social class with common interests and identity. The theoretical presumption of “no bourgeois, no democracy” is also questioned and modified. Based on these studies, the paper argues that the existing studies have had too much presumptions with the private entrepreneurs’ role in democratization process, either for it or against it, while neglecting the actual influences of the private entrepreneurs on policy making and implementation, individually or collectively. This, however, signifies great political change in contemporary China. Therefore, this paper suggests it is necessary to reflect on the existing theoretical presumption that in order to deepen our understanding of the relationship between Chinese government and private entrepreneurs. Furthermore, a possible turn in the studies on private entrepreneurs in China is from democratization approach to policy influence approach, as well as the change of focus from “autonomy” to “influence”.

Key words: private entrepreneurs, informal relations, political cooptation, governmentbusiness relations, policy lobbying