Chinese Journal of Sociology

Previous Articles    

The Institutional Analysis and Practical Logic of “Mixed Land Ownership”: Based on a Case Study of Z Village

  

  1. Author 1: YANG Lei, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology；
    Author 2: LIU Jianping, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
  • Online:2015-03-24 Published:2015-03-24
  • Contact: YANG Lei, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology E-mail:yanglei420@126.com
  • Supported by:
    This research was supported by Humanites and Social Sciences Planning Fund from Ministry of Education（12YJA630072），and Technology Innovation Research Project of Innovation Institute of Huazhong University of Science and Technology（cx14-048）.

PDF

658

Abstract: This paper explains the inner structure, complex relationships and enforcement mechanism of Chinese rural land property by using an analytical concept of “mixed land ownership”. With an institutionalism approach, this paper points out the system of mixed land ownership has four dimensions of property rights, that is, public governance, social relations and customs and ideas, all of which form an institutional arrangement with a strong binding. A typical case study of Z Village land compensation distribution shows that, rules of above four dimensions all have effects on the enforcement of mixed land ownership, and jointly determine the processes and effects of the enforcement of rural land ownership. Firstly, the implementation of rural land ownership shows the inner logic of uncertain rules, institutional rules of different dimensions competing with each other. This situation provides institutional spaces for stakeholders'strategic behavior, and they compete to obtain revenues of land ownership transactions, which result in intensified land conflicts. Secondly, due to mutual combination of institutional rules, the existing land ownership enforcement falls into the plight of multiple equilibriums, which lead to an unbalance of interests between state, collectives and farmers. If farmers cannot reach an agreement on distributing land revenues, the inner costs of land property rights transaction increases. Thirdly, in the process of determining the distribution rules on land revenues, the tension between contract and management rights and collective member rights is a fundamental contradiction and an important reason that would induce land revenues distribution conflicts among farmers. Finally, as the land contract and management system is increasingly stabilized, and farmers' ideas on land property concept are growing, household contract and management rights with the contractual nature have been recognized by more and more farmers. Therefore, during the economic and social transformation, on the one hand, the realities of governance path dependence and local regulations should be fully respected, and socialized governance mechanisms of land property rights system should be improved. On the other hand, to build a modern rural land property system that can balance interests of multi-stakeholders, and to give farmers more land rights and reduce transaction costs of agricultural land resource allocation should be encouraged.

Key words: mixed land ownership ,  multiple equilibriums ,  institutional analysis,  uncertainty rules