中国地方政府官员的空间流动:层级分流模式与经验证据

Abstract

Abstract:

Spatial mobility among officials has been an important mechanism of political control in China's governance. We propose a model of stratified mobility across administrative jurisdictions to explain patterns of spatial mobility in the Chinese bureaucracy, and develop related concepts, typologies, and measures for our empirical analyses. We illustrate our theoretical arguments using empirical findings of spatial mobility in a large bureaucracy-local governments in one province of China, from 1990 to 2008. This research contributes to the study of the Chinese bureaucracy by (1) providing baselines for the key empirical patterns of mobility among offices and across administrative levels; (2) developing a set of concepts, categories and related measurements for characterizing social network structures resulting from personnel flow across government offices.

Key words: governance, stratified mobility, spatial mobility, personnel network

ZHOU Xueguang, AI Yun, GE Jianhua, GU Huijun, LI Lan, LU Qinglian, ZHAO Wei, ZHU Ling. Stratified Mobility in Chinese Bureaucracy: A Model and Empirical Evidence[J]. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 2018, 38(3): 1-45.

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Stratified Mobility in Chinese Bureaucracy: A Model and Empirical Evidence

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