Abstract: There are various theoretical characterizations of the state-society relationship of imperial China， such as “gentry autonomy”， “bureaucratic society”， “state-society cooperation”，“strong despotic power and weak infrastructural power”， and “centralized minimalism” and so on. This paper reexamines the key nature of state-society relations of imperial China from the viewpoint of the administrative subcontracting theory. Our analysis applies the key concept of “administrative outsourcing” that refers to the assignment of public affairs by the imperial state to social groups （e.g.， clans and guilds） or individuals （local gentry） outside the government system. In this administrative outsourcing process， the social groups or individuals certified as subcontractors enjoy certain privileges and honors， or even semi-public identities， but at the same time are subjected to government supervision and hierarchical control， which is different from market-based outsourcing. In contrast， internal administrative subcontracting involves the higher-level government assigning public affairs or other government targets to the lower-level government in a subcontracting way. This study focuses on the correspondence between the features of state governance in the domains such as resource extraction， regime stability maintenance， local public goods provision， and internal civil internal order （e.g.， clans and guilds）， and the specific modes of administrative outsourcing. By so doing， the underlying mechanism of state-society interactions in the Chinese imperial system is uncovered. We argue that the specific modes of administrative outsourcing are determined by tradeoffs between governance risks and administrative costs associated with specific governance domains as well as the fiscal constraints of the state. As a result of such tradeoffs， we have observed a spectrum of governance modes of administrative outsourcing varying in combinations of government control and civil autonomy across governance domains. For instance， in high governance risk domains such as resource extraction and social order maintenance （taxation and public security）， numerous local semi-public agents were designated as subcontractors under strong controls from the government. For the domain of local civil order with relatively low governance risk but potentially high administrative costs if the government would exercise direct controls， civic organizations such as clans， guilds， and merchant clubhouses were offered a high degree of autonomy over their internal affairs with only contingent interferences from the government. This paper suggests a new notion of “one body， many faces” to recapitulate the overall nature of the state-society relationship of imperial China， to offer a new analytical framework to reconcile diverse theoretical characterizations existing in literature， and to help understand the paradoxical combination of the unity of state power and the pluralism of state governance in the Chinese imperial system.

Key words: state-society relations, administrative outsourcing, traditional state governance, imperial China