Abstract: The post-war takeover of colonies is a contemporary issue of new nation building brought about by the two world wars in the 20th century. After the Japanese occupation, Northeast China became the focus of competition between the KMT and the CPC because of its industrial importance. This article provides a comparative study of these two parties’s takeover plans for the post-war Northeast China. By examining the specific strategies and processes of the two parties’ responses to the regional industrial heritage， it reveals different organizational difficulties and their respective strategies to overcome them. The study finds that the KMT and the CPC were unable to implement their takeover plans at the beginning. The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Northeast China affairs， as well as the urban-rural structural divide dictated by the railway network left by the Japanese occupation， interfered with as well as restricted the action of the KMT and the CPC. Specifically， at the time mobilization was the basic organizational logics of the CPC while in contrast demobilization was the basic organizational logics of the KMT. The conflict between tiao and kuai and the tension between “unification” and “division” were the structural difficulties the two parties were facing respectively. Under the geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet Union， the KMT was confined to metropolis and railway lines and the technocrats responsible for takeover had very limited room for action. What’s more， the competition between military operations and resumption of work and production caused the self-destruction of KMT’s takeover. However， although the CPC was forced to retreat to the countryside， it was able to carry on its experience in the Soviet bases and promote the organizational innovation of military， political and economic cadres in the process of unifying finance and returning to the cities， resulting in its organizational self-strengthening. This article points out that the difference in the takeover plans of the Northeast China reflects the differences in the overall strategies of the two parties， as well as the two parties’ respective use of organizational principles in dealing with geopolitics and the regional legacy. The takeover of the Northeast China， in terms of organizational regime， was precisely the turning point of China’s national construction in the middle of the 20th century， and the organizational creation inspired by it provided the CPC with an organizational transformation mechanism from wartime to normalization. Therefore， the CPC was able to smoothly transit to the construction of the Northeast region immediately after its military victory.

Key words: organizational regime, takeover, Northeast China, industrial heritage, geopolitics