Abstract:

This article proposes a new perspective on an old and great issue: the stability-instability cycle in the Chinese Empires. It aims to unpuzzle the following questions: What is the relationship between stability-instability cycles and ruler strategy on risk governance? What mechanism do rulers employ to balance between varied risks? Why does the mechanism work well some of the time, but breaks down in another moment?
Upon examining the historical process in the Chinese Empires, we find that the evidence supports an alternative account, the impossible trinity of risk governance, to explain the stability-instability cycle. Three main risks, coup, revolution, and foreign invasion, challenged regime stability.Limited by fiscal capacity, it was almost impossible for rulers to deal with these three risks simultaneously. They only could manage two risks at the same time. This is the so-called impossible trinity of risk governance in the article. Usually, when rulers were engaged in governing the risk of coup and revolution, regimes were more stable. However, once the third risk, foreign invasion, appeared and created imbalance in fiscal distribution, regimes turn to instability.
A common cycle of the stability-instability and risk governance model is as follows: In the beginning of a dynasty, rulers place priority on governing the risk of revolution and coup. In order to pacify citizens who have suffered from the civil war, and to consolidate their regime, rulers reduce the tax burden on citizens and co-opt potential political challengers. This is usually the period of prosperity applauded by historians. Later, military actions for defense or expansion break down this stability. Rulers raise taxes for military expenditure and this induces resistance from citizens. This turns stability into instability. To maintain the power, rulers put a halt to military actions and turn to governing the risk of revolution and coup. This period of time is seen as a renaissance. Soon after, the next military action interrupts the stability and starts another cycle.
In the historical cycle, it is worth noting that though all rebalancing strategies adopted by rulers were similar, the effects were different. Normally, the rebalancing strategy became less and less eficient in the latter period of dynasty. Via process tracing analysis, this article argues that the co-optation strategy adopted by rulers to prevent political risk in the beginning of the dynasty, triggers an unintended sequence that ruins the mechanism of risk governance, undermines state infrastructure power, and eventually threatens regime survival.

Key words: state infrastructure power, risk governance, political co-optation, authoritarian regime survival