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Table of Content

    20 May 2017, Volume 37 Issue 3
    Centralization and Decentralization of Power Structure: A Theory of Ruling Risks and Empirical Evidence from Chinese History
    CAO Zhenghan
    2017, 37(3):  1-45. 
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    In Chinese history, the power relationship between the central and local government has undergone perennial and critical changes. These changes have given rise to three questions: First,why did some dynasties adopt feudalism early on, only to curtail local authority in times of stability? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasty employ a native chieftain system, while the Qing dynasty struggled to bureaucratize the native officers in ethnic minority areas?Third, why were the dynasties of the Han ethnicity so hesitant to set up a provincial government, but nomadic societies did not view this as a dillemma? Furthermore, why was the ethnically Han Qing dynasty able to break down these contradictions and create a stable provincial government and provincial state? This paper demonstrates that these changes can be explained by the propensity of the rulers to minimize the ruling risks and the constraints they encountered. Specifically, the ruler's decision to centralize or decentralize power was constrained by certain challenges, such as fiscal and administrative costs, military technology and political competition. These constraints impelled the ruling class to deviate from the system of prefectures and counties. Under these circumstances, the central government had to endure relatively higher social risks and risks of delegating power. The central government, however, would reduce social and delegate risks so long as constraints were loosened, which triggered the evolution of the power structure between the central and local government. Another potential driving force behind the changes of power structure came from the dynamic between social and agency risks. When the social risks or agency risks increased, the central government would readjust the centralization and decentralization of power among different government levels to control the rising risks.

    The Theoretical Research Approach to History and the Theoretical Model
    LIU Shiding
    2017, 37(3):  46-66. 
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    Reviewing Professor Cao Zhenghan's research, this article develops a theoretical model to explain the history of state centralization and decentralization in China, and emphasizes that conceptual and logical analysis is helpful to understand this kind of organizational phenomena. We comment that it is not appropriate to place risk theory and efficiency theory in opposition; rather, it is much more necessary to distinguish the kind of governance, efficiency, and efficient individuals. This paper analyzes the relationship between the efficiency of governance with political risks and the efficiency of daily administration, and discusses the maximum efficiency of daily administrative governance, and the behavioral choices if political risks are minimized. It examines the concepts of over-centralization and over-decentralization, and emphasizes the significance of efficiency distinction in understanding the phenomenon of non-equilibrium separatism in Chinese history. This paper also points out that it is necessary to illustrate the governances both within and beyond the border of the ruler's power. Under certain conditions the decentralization will lead to further decentralization; centralization will lead to further centralization.

    The Agency Problem and Governance: Comments on the Risk-Minimizing Theory
    CAI Yongshun
    2017, 37(3):  67-84. 
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    The inevitable choice for the ruler who wants to govern a vast territory is decentralization. But a ruler faces risks when delegating power because local governments, or their agents, may challenge a ruler when they gain enough resources and power. Therefore, decentralization constitutes a problemfor the ruler of delegating power to different agents. In his analysis of the evolution of the governance structure in ancient China, Cao Zhenghan proposes that the jun-xian system is an effective arrangement to solve the problem of delegates. This system prevents the rise of a powerful local government that is able to challenge the ruler while still ensuring that local delegates perform the duties assigned by the ruler. But an effective jun-xian system has to meet a series of conditions. Cao's “risk-minimizing” theory explains the political logic of decentralization in ancient China, but it does not examine other issues arising from decentralization. This paper explores how decentralization may affect the political stability of authoritarian rule. It suggests that decentralization not only reduces risk for the ruler, but also creates immunity from blame and recrimination. But decentralization can also create a series of problems for the ruler. First, delegates who are not effectively constrained weaken state capacity. When self-serving agents pursue their personal interests at the expense of the ruler and the people, they undermine the ruler's policy choices. Second, the self-serving behavior of some delegates can also undermine regime legitimacy and give rise to risks. Therefore, a top ruler faces the constant issue of how to solve the problem of delegating power.

    Stability-Instability Cycle and Impossible Trinity in the Chinese Empires: A Perspective from Risk Governance
    YU Yi-wen
    2017, 37(3):  85-102. 
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    This article proposes a new perspective on an old and great issue: the stability-instability cycle in the Chinese Empires. It aims to unpuzzle the following questions: What is the relationship between stability-instability cycles and ruler strategy on risk governance? What mechanism do rulers employ to balance between varied risks? Why does the mechanism work well some of the time, but breaks down in another moment?
    Upon examining the historical process in the Chinese Empires, we find that the evidence supports an alternative account, the impossible trinity of risk governance, to explain the stability-instability cycle. Three main risks, coup, revolution, and foreign invasion, challenged regime stability.Limited by fiscal capacity, it was almost impossible for rulers to deal with these three risks simultaneously. They only could manage two risks at the same time. This is the so-called impossible trinity of risk governance in the article. Usually, when rulers were engaged in governing the risk of coup and revolution, regimes were more stable. However, once the third risk, foreign invasion, appeared and created imbalance in fiscal distribution, regimes turn to instability.
    A common cycle of the stability-instability and risk governance model is as follows: In the beginning of a dynasty, rulers place priority on governing the risk of revolution and coup. In order to pacify citizens who have suffered from the civil war, and to consolidate their regime, rulers reduce the tax burden on citizens and co-opt potential political challengers. This is usually the period of prosperity applauded by historians. Later, military actions for defense or expansion break down this stability. Rulers raise taxes for military expenditure and this induces resistance from citizens. This turns stability into instability. To maintain the power, rulers put a halt to military actions and turn to governing the risk of revolution and coup. This period of time is seen as a renaissance. Soon after, the next military action interrupts the stability and starts another cycle.
    In the historical cycle, it is worth noting that though all rebalancing strategies adopted by rulers were similar, the effects were different. Normally, the rebalancing strategy became less and less eficient in the latter period of dynasty. Via process tracing analysis, this article argues that the co-optation strategy adopted by rulers to prevent political risk in the beginning of the dynasty, triggers an unintended sequence that ruins the mechanism of risk governance, undermines state infrastructure power, and eventually threatens regime survival.

    Educational Homogamy and Family Earnings Inequality in China: 1996—2012
    LI Dai
    2017, 37(3):  103-130. 
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    In recent years,research on assortative mating and educational homogamy has attracted much attention in sociology. This paper,adopting LHSC1996 and CGSS2012 cross-sectional data,first uses log-linear models to measure educational homogamy and Pearson's correlation coefficients to measure earnings correlation between spouses,then uses fuzzy permutation tests to measure the contribution of educational homogamy towards earnings inequality,in terms of the Theil Index,controlling for age,province and hukou status. Comparing results from two years,this paper reveals that the trend of said contribution. First,CGSS2012 shows an elevated family earnings inequality in total,and pairing over all dimensions discussed contributes more to inequality than before. Second,pairing over all dimensions discussed show similar contributions to earlier counterparts,except for a difference in extent. Third,educational pairing contributes significantly more to inequality in CGSS2012. Its main effect and net effect controlling for aforementioned covariates are both positive,which means educational homogamy increases family earnings inequality. This paper contributes to empirical knowledge as well as methodical advances. We have concluded that fuzzy permutation tests can include continuous variables.

    School Merging, Family Background and Opportunities of Education Attainment
    PAN Guanghui
    2017, 37(3):  131-162. 
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    The school merging process,begun in the mid 1990s, aimed at optimizing the distribution of resources and improving the quality of compulsory education. This process had an significant influence on educational opportunities for rural children. Due to the decrease in education resources, this paper aims to answer how the family background of some students influence educational opportunities. In this paper,I divide family background into three kinds of capital: cultural, economic, and political capital. Using panel resampling cases taken from the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) in 2010 to 2012,and by reviewing the educational experiences of rural students from primary school to graduation from junior high school, I use the Cox model to establish a “drop-out model” and use a logistic model and linear probability model to establish the “high school entrance-model”. I obtained the following results: family background will always be a crucial factor for educational opportunities; the risk of school drop-out surprisingly declined in the beginning years of the school merging process; parents' capital has played a more important role after school merging. With the response to the policy change from families, the negative effects of the policy have been denied, or remedies have been postponed. The policy change encourages rural families to invest actively in the education of their desendant. Among the three categories of capital, investments in cultural capital have the biggest effect, increasing survival time and educational opportunities. I hold the view that the rebirth of education that can be observed on the macro scale is mirrored by the micro choices of the family on the institutional level.

    The Size,Structure, and Development Strategy of the Middle Class in China
    LI Qiang, WANG Hao
    2017, 37(3):  163-179. 
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    This paper argues that the middle class is not the same thing as a middle income group. We should analyze the size and structure of the middle class from the dimensions of income,occupation,and education. Based on data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) it was found in 2005,2010,and 2013 that the proportion of the middle-income group in China is relatively large,but the proportion of the real middle class is still small. The middle class is more and more concentrated in urban areas and the eastern region. The social structure gaps between urban and rural areas,and between the eastern,central,and western regions continue to widen. The development of the middle class in primary industries also encounters great obstacles. This paper argues that to strengthen the middle class,it is necessary to increase income,restructure industry and occupational structures,popularize education,promote the development of the middle class in rural areas,central regions,and western regions,and help migrant workers get into the middle class through the upgrading of skills and the encouragement of independent management.

    The Peasant Movement School in Communist Party's Early Rural Revolutionary Practice
    MENG Qingyan
    2017, 37(3):  180-214. 
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    An important condition that revolutionary parties must meet in practice is the mobilizationof the masses. It is through a series of mobilization strategies and organization techniques that the CCP, a revolutionary party, infuses its ideology into rural society. Therefore, “examining the class” (cha jieji), a technique of organization and mobilization that the CCP has formed in its revolutionary practices, is of great importance to understanding the CCP's political culture. This technique includes two stages: “calculating class” (a quantification of social class), which focuses on objective factors such as economic criteria; and “making revolution” (naogeming), which focuses on subjective elements such as emotional excitement and violent struggle. From the perspective of mobilization analysis, the existing scholarship usually treats “making revolution” as a deviation from the Party's conventional revolutionary practices with regards to its disregard of quantified economic criteria and its ritual and violent character. However, few studies explore the historical origin of “making revolution”. This article attempts to revisit the genetic process and political tradition of “making revolution”. It shows that “making revolution” originates from the Peasant Movement Institute that was set by the KMT's Central Peasant Department in the period of National Revolution from 1924 to 1927, and features in the central role of peasant movement cadres of whom Peng Pai was the typical example. By synthesizing various historical documents, this article is to present the essential features of “making revolution”, which was used as a measure to mobilize. The conclusion is based on a preliminary study of peasant movements in Hunan and Guangdong in the period of National Revolution from 1924 to 1927 and the analysis of the curriculum and ideas of the Peasant Movement Institute. This article discusses the activites of Peng Pai and his fellow CCP members in the Peasant Movement Institute, focusing on their life story, educational background, and revolutionary activities. It presents not only the special ethos of these CCP members as the “deep tiller” of the revolution and an agitator of the masses, but also discusses acertain philosophies (such as anarchism) which arose under specific social and historical conditions. More importantly, this article proclaims that the recontextualization of mobilization strategies such as “making revolution” enables a deeper understanding of the CCP's multi-facet revolutionary practices in its early years. This article analyzes “making revolution” in a particular historical situation and tries to understand its main structural factors and the historical roots of its limitations.

    Policy Implement Cost and Occurring Mechanism of Bargaining among the Chinese Governmental Hierarchy: Based on Analysis Example of Prohibition of Grazing in Sidong County
    FENG Meng
    2017, 37(3):  215-241. 
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    Bargaining is a significant form of interaction for the Chinese government. Therefore the mechanism of bargaining is suggested as a representative operational model to understand the behaviors of local governments in the hierarchical system of government. The paper describes in detail several rounds of bargaining between superior and subordinate government officials in the process of implementing the prohibition of grazing in Sidong County. The policy was made at the county level. Township-level governments choose to bargain with their superior due to the difficulty of implementation in the early stages,and then failed. Strict implementation led to frequent conflicts between local government and peasants. The township-level instantly turned to bargaining with the county-level government,and used a confrontational strategy to successfully obtain relatively more freedom for implementation. From a theoretical perspective,this paper uses the analysis framework for implementation costa to illustrate the functioning mechanism of bargaining behavior. The different combinations of implementation costs cause township-level governments to choose or adjust to different methods. The high cost of implementation processes leave township level government to use bargaining as the only reasonable method of implementation. Subordinate governments choose bargaining again when facing strict implementation orders from superiors,and difficult implementation conditions from the public. Bargaining is also their only choice when they cannot achieve the target,although they seek to implement policies to the utmost extent. The process of bargaining indicates that,township level governments improve bargaining ability relative to strict requirements for implementation of policy and intensifying social conflicts. The essential features of bargaining are:no deadlock implementation,wagging agreement point,alternative occurrence between short-run equilibrium and bargaining in policy implementation,and bargaining among the Chinese governmental hierarchy. From the institutional point of view,the implementation of new policies create opportunities for bargaining,and makes easier bargaining between superior and subordinate governments.