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利益、博弈与养老金改革:对养老金制度的政治社会学分析

杨立雄   

  1. 中国人民大学劳动人事学院
  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-07-20 发布日期:2008-07-20

Interests， Games， and Pension Reform：Analysis of Pension System by Political Sociology

Yang lixiong   

  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-07-20 Published:2008-07-20

摘要：

本文运用新多元主义理论探讨养老金改革中的利益博弈和私有化改革的发展趋势。对拉美和中东欧国家的研究表明，养老金的改革得益于其特殊的政治体制、外生行动者的支持和政府的强力推动，而否决点的缺失和社会组织力量的弱小又减少了养老金改革的阻力。但对美国、英国和欧洲的分析表明，由于利益的多元化、否决点的分散，以及强大的工会力量，社会保障私有化的改革困难重重。

关键词: 社会学, 养老金私有化, 行动者, 否决点

Abstract:

This paper discusses the interest games in the process of pension reform and the trend of pension privatization by employing the neopluralism theory. The research on Latin America and CentralEastern Europe demonstrates that the pension reforms in those areas benefit from their special political systems， support from exogenous actors and the powerful drive from the government， and that the reduced resistance against pension reforms can be attributed to lacking of veto points and weak social organizations. In contrast， the analysis of the situations in the U.S.A， UK， and EU reveals the tremendous difficulty in pension privatization due to diversified interests， multilevel veto points， and powerful trade unions.

Key words: actor, veto point, pension privatization, sociology