史普原 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院
出版日期:
2015-09-20
发布日期:
2015-09-20
通讯作者:
史普原 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院
E-mail:oxfordyps@126.com
基金资助:
SHI Puyuan,Zhou Enlai School of Government,Nankai University
Online:
2015-09-20
Published:
2015-09-20
Contact:
SHI Puyuan,Zhou Enlai School of Government,Nankai University
E-mail:oxfordyps@126.com
Supported by:
This paper was subsidized by Chinese Scholarship Council (No.\[2012\]3013), and Chinese Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 2015M570223).
摘要: 当前中国政府组织中项目泛滥,其运作往往离不开科层体制,要想深入理解项目运作,就要探讨它与科层制的复杂关系。立足于基础性组织理论,本文提炼出项目制的三重构成要素,并与科层制进行比较,勾勒出两者之间的关系,尤其是看似融合背后的张力。这种张力体现在:项目统一规划与科层条线传递之间的张力;项目的时段性与科层的常态性之间的张力;项目的目标导向与科层的规则导向之间的张力。在当前政府科层体制缺乏有效外部约束、项目发包方与需求方隔离过远等条件下,这种张力体现得淋漓尽致,呈现出“科层为体、项目为用”式的项目运作机制。本文以中央农口项目的整合为案例,指出这项中央、省级和基层均有意为之的变革最终失败的根本原因就来自上述系统性张力。本文通过对多级科层组织策略实践的考察,具体而微地刻画了这种张力的表现形式。
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