Chinese Journal of Sociology ›› 2017, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (3): 1-45.

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Centralization and Decentralization of Power Structure: A Theory of Ruling Risks and Empirical Evidence from Chinese History

CAO Zhenghan   

  1. Department of Sociology, Zhejiang University;Center for Local Govermance Studies, Zhejiang University
  • Online:2017-05-20 Published:2017-05-20

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Abstract:

In Chinese history, the power relationship between the central and local government has undergone perennial and critical changes. These changes have given rise to three questions: First,why did some dynasties adopt feudalism early on, only to curtail local authority in times of stability? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasty employ a native chieftain system, while the Qing dynasty struggled to bureaucratize the native officers in ethnic minority areas?Third, why were the dynasties of the Han ethnicity so hesitant to set up a provincial government, but nomadic societies did not view this as a dillemma? Furthermore, why was the ethnically Han Qing dynasty able to break down these contradictions and create a stable provincial government and provincial state? This paper demonstrates that these changes can be explained by the propensity of the rulers to minimize the ruling risks and the constraints they encountered. Specifically, the ruler's decision to centralize or decentralize power was constrained by certain challenges, such as fiscal and administrative costs, military technology and political competition. These constraints impelled the ruling class to deviate from the system of prefectures and counties. Under these circumstances, the central government had to endure relatively higher social risks and risks of delegating power. The central government, however, would reduce social and delegate risks so long as constraints were loosened, which triggered the evolution of the power structure between the central and local government. Another potential driving force behind the changes of power structure came from the dynamic between social and agency risks. When the social risks or agency risks increased, the central government would readjust the centralization and decentralization of power among different government levels to control the rising risks.