From Qin Dynasty up to Qing Dynasty, officials appointed by the central government in imperial China were not only beholden to their superiors but also acted as brokers for local interests. We characterize such a structural position as having “dual accountability.” Although the accountability to superiors is readily understandable within the Weberian framework of bureaucratic hierarchy, the reasons behind the local accountability needs an explanation. This paper attempts to explain how officials worked for their regional interests by analyzing the dual accountability in East Han Dynasty (25-220 AD). By investigating the larger contexts of the government structure, political ideology, and personnel system at the time, we have offered three explanations in the paperpractical necessity, “Confucian” ideology, and reputational mechanism, which have received some supportive empirical evidence from multiple sources, including the administrative records and inscriptions on ancient stelae. In addition, we question Weber’s analysis of the Chinese imperial governing system and present new ideas about the social rationality underlying an “inefficient” system that was in place for two millennia.