社会杂志

• 专题：行政发包制研究 •    下一篇

行政发包制

  

  1. 周黎安，北京大学光华管理学院
  • 出版日期:2014-11-20 发布日期:2014-11-20
  • 通讯作者: 周黎安，北京大学光华管理学院 E-mail:zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn

Administrative Subcontract

  1. ZHOU Li-An，Guanghua School of Management，Peking University
  • Online:2014-11-20 Published:2014-11-20
  • Contact: ZHOU Li-An，Guanghua School of Management，Peking University E-mail:zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn

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摘要： 本文试图论证行政发包制在中国作为一种分析政府间关系、官员激励和政府治理的理论框架所具有的独特内涵、价值和意义。行政发包制是指政府内部上下级之间的发包关系。作为一种理想类型，它既有别于韦伯意义上的科层制，也有别于纯粹的外包制，而是居于两者之间的一种混合形态。行政发包制在行政权分配、经济激励和内部控制三个维度上呈现相互配合和内在一致的特征，适合概括中国政府间关系和治理模式的长期稳定而鲜明的特征。提出行政发包制,有助于重新解释许多有关中国政府运行的特征和现象，同时也可以揭示一系列未被现有文献系统关注的政府现象和问题。本文还将行政发包制与“政治锦标赛”理论结合起来，从纵向行政发包和横向晋升竞争两个维度进一步拓展关于官员激励和政府治理的分析深度和广度。

Abstract: Abstract： This paper attempts to demonstrate the significance, relevance and implications of “administrative subcontract” as an analytical framework to understand China’s intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic incentives, and administrative governance. As an ideal type, administrative subcontract refers to a subcontracting relation inside the government system, represent a hybrid governance structure between bureaucracy in a Weberian sense and pure subcontract which occurs among independent entities without any hierarchical relations. Administrative subcontract exhibits a coherent and consistent set of characteristics along the dimensions of authority relations, economic incentives, and internal control. With respect to authority relations, administrative subcontract features an allocation of authority between the principal and agent where the principal has the formal authority and residual control rights (such as the authority to appoint/remove, supervise and monitor subcontractors and the option to intervene when necessary), and the agent, by way of subcontracting, enjoys considerable discretion and de facto power to do things in his own way. Under the administrative subcontract regime, the agent is a residual claimant over the budget money or revenues either collected through serviceprovision or allocated by the principal. In terms of internal control, the administrative subcontract is outcomeoriented rather than procedure/processoriented. I argue that these three dimensions are complementary and mutually supportive, and tend to commove if the system encounters systematic shocks. This new framework helps us pin down the key and durable features of China’s intergovernmental relations and administrative governance. The notion of administrative subcontract enables us to reinterpret many puzzling observations and patterns regarding the workings of China’s government system and to bring some important and yet long understudied issues to our attention. I will also combine the theory of administrative subcontract with that of political tournaments to extend our analysis of China’s political incentives and governance. From the viewpoint of vertical subcontracting and horizontal (political) competition inside the government system, I attempt to explain the strength and weakness of China’s state capacity in various areas of public services.