社会杂志

• 专题：行政发包制研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

统治风险与地方分权——关于中国国家治理的三种理论及其比较

  

  1. 曹正汉 浙江大学经济学院
  • 出版日期:2014-11-20 发布日期:2014-11-20
  • 通讯作者: 曹正汉 浙江大学经济学院 E-mail:caozhenghan@aliyun.com

Political Risks and Decentralization: The Comparison of Three Models on Chinese Governance

  1. CAO Zhenghan, College of Economics, Zhejiang University
  • Online:2014-11-20 Published:2014-11-20
  • Contact: CAO Zhenghan, College of Economics, Zhejiang University E-mail:caozhenghan@aliyun.com

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摘要： 在研究中国国家治理时，同时考虑中央政府关心的效率目标和政权稳定目标的理论有三种，即：周黎安提出的“行政发包制”模型，曹正汉等提出的“中央治官、地方治民”模型以及周雪光提出的“帝国的治理逻辑”。然而，这三种理论关于中央政府的效率目标和政权稳定目标能否兼容存在着明显分歧；此外，这三种理论在分析层面上也存在差别。导致分歧和差别的原因有两个：一个是关于兵民能否分治，三种理论隐含着不同的假定；另一个是关于中央政府着重防范的统治风险的来源，是来自地方分权本身（如地方政府的“各自为政”、“偏离”、“失控”等行为），还是来自被统治的民众（如民众可能的抗议、反对或对抗等行为），三种理论持有不同的观点。

关键词: 集权国家 , 统治风险 , 地方分权 , 治理结构

Abstract: There are three models on the structure of Chinese governance, all taking account of the central government’s objectives about governance efficiency and political stability at the same time. They are the “administrative subcontract system” model by Zhou LiAn, the model of “centralized personal controls at the national level, and decentralized ruling over the people regionally” by Cao Zhenghan, and the “empire’s governance logic”  model by Zhou Xueguang. All three models have significant divergences in terms of whether the two objectives of efficiency and stability of  the central government can be compatible or not. Zhou LiAn and Cao Zhenghan argue that the two objectives are compatible in specific governance structure, which is not shared by Zhou Xueguang who argues that the coexistence of centralization and decentralization cannot lead to a stable structure and the two processes are subject to cyclical adjustment and cyclic fluctuation. And also, the analyses of the three models focus on different levels. The “administrative subcontract system” model and the “empire’s governance logic” model mainly discuss the governance structure and mechanism of the different levels of governments within the bureaucratic system, while the model of “centralized personal controls at the national level, and decentralized ruling over the people regionally” focuses on how the way of central government dealing with the public shapes the basic structure of decentralization. The divergences are caused by two reasons. First, these three models hold different assumptions about whether the rule over the military and the people can be separated. Second, there exists the disagreement about which one is the critical source of political risks between decentralization itself (e.g. the local governments’ behaviors as deviation, out of control, etc.) and the public (e.g. the public’s behaviors as protest, opposition, confrontation, etc.).

Key words: authoritarian regimes , decentralization , governance structure, political risks