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“混合地权”的制度分析及其实践逻辑——基于Z村村民小组的个案分析

  

  1. 作者1：杨磊，华中科技大学公共管理学院；
    作者2：刘建平，华中科技大学公共管理学院
  • 出版日期:2015-03-24 发布日期:2015-03-24
  • 通讯作者: 杨磊，华中科技大学公共管理学院 E-mail:yanglei420@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    本研究受教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目（12YJA630072）和华中科技大学创新研究院技术创新基金项目（cx14-048）的资助。

The Institutional Analysis and Practical Logic of “Mixed Land Ownership”: Based on a Case Study of Z Village

  1. Author 1: YANG Lei, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology；
    Author 2: LIU Jianping, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
  • Online:2015-03-24 Published:2015-03-24
  • Contact: YANG Lei, School of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology E-mail:yanglei420@126.com
  • Supported by:
    This research was supported by Humanites and Social Sciences Planning Fund from Ministry of Education（12YJA630072），and Technology Innovation Research Project of Innovation Institute of Huazhong University of Science and Technology（cx14-048）.

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摘要： 本文通过“混合地权”的概念来解释中国农村土地产权的内在结构、关系和实施机制。借用制度分析方法指出，混合地权的制度系统包括财产权利、公共治理、社会关系和观念习俗等四个维度，它们是具有很强约束力的制度安排。通过对Z村村民小组的个案研究发现，不同维度的规则对混合地权的实施都产生了影响，共同决定了农地产权实施的过程和效果，使得地权实施呈现出不确定性规则的内在逻辑，陷入多重均衡和交易成本高的困境，且承包经营权和集体成员权之间的张力是根本性矛盾。个案研究还发现，农民的财产权利观念不断增强，家庭承包经营权得到了越来越多的农民认可。在经济社会转型中，应完善集体土地所有制的社会化治理机制，构建起一种平衡多方利益的现代农村土地产权制度。

关键词: 不确定性规则 , 混合地权 , 多重均衡 , 制度分析

Abstract: This paper explains the inner structure, complex relationships and enforcement mechanism of Chinese rural land property by using an analytical concept of “mixed land ownership”. With an institutionalism approach, this paper points out the system of mixed land ownership has four dimensions of property rights, that is, public governance, social relations and customs and ideas, all of which form an institutional arrangement with a strong binding. A typical case study of Z Village land compensation distribution shows that, rules of above four dimensions all have effects on the enforcement of mixed land ownership, and jointly determine the processes and effects of the enforcement of rural land ownership. Firstly, the implementation of rural land ownership shows the inner logic of uncertain rules, institutional rules of different dimensions competing with each other. This situation provides institutional spaces for stakeholders'strategic behavior, and they compete to obtain revenues of land ownership transactions, which result in intensified land conflicts. Secondly, due to mutual combination of institutional rules, the existing land ownership enforcement falls into the plight of multiple equilibriums, which lead to an unbalance of interests between state, collectives and farmers. If farmers cannot reach an agreement on distributing land revenues, the inner costs of land property rights transaction increases. Thirdly, in the process of determining the distribution rules on land revenues, the tension between contract and management rights and collective member rights is a fundamental contradiction and an important reason that would induce land revenues distribution conflicts among farmers. Finally, as the land contract and management system is increasingly stabilized, and farmers' ideas on land property concept are growing, household contract and management rights with the contractual nature have been recognized by more and more farmers. Therefore, during the economic and social transformation, on the one hand, the realities of governance path dependence and local regulations should be fully respected, and socialized governance mechanisms of land property rights system should be improved. On the other hand, to build a modern rural land property system that can balance interests of multi-stakeholders, and to give farmers more land rights and reduce transaction costs of agricultural land resource allocation should be encouraged.

Key words: mixed land ownership ,  multiple equilibriums ,  institutional analysis,  uncertainty rules