社会杂志 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (1): 34-64.

• 专题:官僚体制与国家治理研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

行政发包的组织边界:兼论“官吏分途”与“层级分流”现象

周黎安   

  1. 北京大学光华管理学院
  • 出版日期:2016-01-20 发布日期:2016-01-20
  • 通讯作者: 周黎安 北京大学光华管理学院,E-mail:zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn E-mail:zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn

Organizational Boundary of Administrative Subcontracting: An Analysis of “the Separation of Officials and Local Staff” and Stratified Mobility

ZHOU Li-An   

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
  • Online:2016-01-20 Published:2016-01-20

摘要: 本文重新梳理了行政发包制理论中“行政”与“发包”的关系,将政治晋升机制正式引入行政发包关系,定义了行政内部发包与行政外部发包的组织边界。在此基础上,本文重新诠释了历史上的“官吏分途”以及当今的“层级分流”现象。本文认为,从秦汉到明清,中国经历了“官吏分途”和“吏役合一”的双重过程,这实际上代表了中国官僚体制组织边界的重大变化,即从“行政内包”到“行政外包”的过程,而推动整个过程的驱动力是帝国所面临的日益严重的财政压力。本文还对中国历史上国家与社会的关系特征进行了重新表述。相同的历史现象,不同的解析框架,本文与周雪光的帝国逻辑理论进行了一次深入的学术对话。

关键词: 政府组织边界 , 晋升机制 , 行政发包制 , 行政外包 , 官吏分途

Abstract: This paper introduces an analysis of administrative subcontracting in relation to the promotion mechanism in Chinese government administration and redefines the organizational boundary between internal and outsourcing administrative subcontracting. The relationship between administration and subcontracting is examined through the two salient features of government, namely, multitask and monopoly of public services and state violence. Subcontracting tends to save fiscal and administrative costs for the principles and offer high-powered and differentiated incentives to subcontractors. However, it can also lead to power abuse and multitask distortion. To prevent subcontractors' misbehaviors, bureaucracy is also compelled to impose various administrative measures such as oversight authority, veto power, rules and procedures. The paper further examines the organizational boundary between internal and outsourcing subcontracting through the rank competition and promotion mechanism. If subcontracting is part of competition and promotion process, it is regarded as internal subcontracting within organization; whereas subcontracting separated from the bureaucratic hierarchical mobility is considered as outsourcing subcontracting. Using this new lens of rank promotion mechanism, we reinterpret the so-called “the separation of officials and local staff” (guanli fentu) in imperial China and the stratified mobility in modern time.The paper argues that the twofold process of “separation of officials and staff” and “convergence of staff and hired-hands” in imperial China from Qin-Han to Ming-Qing marked a significant change in state governing boundary from internal subcontracting to outsourcing subcontracting. This occurred because of the increasing revenue pressure. It is our hope that this study opens further dialogues on Xueguang Zhou's administrative subcontracting theory.

Key words: organizational boundary of government, administrative subcontracting, promotion, administrative outsourcing, the separation of officials and local staff