社会杂志 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (5): 107-130.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

张弛有别:上级控制力、下级自主性和农村基层政令执行

陶郁1, 侯麟科2, 刘明兴3   

  1. 1. 英国中央兰开夏大学;
    2. 山东大学经济研究院;
    3. 北京大学中国教育财政科学研究所
  • 出版日期:2016-09-20 发布日期:2016-09-20
  • 通讯作者: 侯麟科 E-mail:abram75@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    本文获得中国博士后科学基金（2013M531570）、山东大学自主创新基金青年团队项目（IFYT1223）和山东大学自主创新基金（2012GN037）的资助。

The Control,Discretion,and Policy Implementation of Local Authorities in Rural China

TAO Yu1, HOU Linke2, LIU Mingxing3   

  1. 1. University of Central Lancashire, United KingdomAuthor;
    2. The Center for Economic Research, Shandong UniversityAuthor;
    3. China Institute for Educational Finance Research, Peking University
  • Online:2016-09-20 Published:2016-09-20
  • Supported by:

    The article was funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2013M531570), Young Scholars' Teamwork Project, Independent Innovation Foundation of Shandong University (IFYT1223), and Independent Innovation Foundation of Shandong University (2012GN037).

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摘要：

本文通过分析多年的全国抽样数据发现，当今中国乡、村两级治理主体执行政令的情况取决于上级控制力和下级自主性之间的张力。在不同治理层级和工作领域之间，由于上述张力存在差异，政令执行情况也不尽相同。具体来说，农村税费改革在进一步强化县级党政机关对乡镇控制力的同时，却削弱了乡镇对村级治理机构的控制力。同时，虽然某些高层特别重视的政令能在相当程度上下达基层，但乡、村两级治理机构往往更倾向于主动重视那些与本位利益直接相关的工作，并常会有选择地忽视那些上级重视程度不高、不易考核和难以直接带来本位利益的工作。

关键词: 下级自主性, 政令执行, 选择性实施, 基层治理结构, 上级控制力

Abstract:

Drawing upon representative national survey data collected in 2000, 2004, and 2007, this paper systematically examines how township and village authorities in contemporary rural China actually implement the policies and instructions that they receive from above. The empirical evidence reveals the following. First, the actual situation of policy implementation in contemporary rural China is often jointly determined by the controlling powers that upper-level authorities have over their subordinate agencies on the one hand, and the discretion enjoyed by the latter on the other. Second, the interactions between upper-level authorities and their subordinate agencies vary across different governmental levels and policy fields. County authorities are more capable in controlling over township authorities, but township authorities often have relatively weaker control over village authorities. Such a pattern was reinforced after the rural taxation reform in early 2000s. In addition, this paper also demonstrates that local authorities in contemporary rural China tend to prioritise activities which can bring about direct benefits to them, even when such activities are not regarded as priorities by their higher-ups.

Key words: controlling power, selective implementation, discretion, local power structure, policy implementation