社会杂志 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (2): 1-45.

• 专题:中国经验的理论建构 •    下一篇

“官场+市场”与中国增长故事

周黎安   

  1. 北京大学光华管理学院
  • 出版日期:2018-03-20 发布日期:2018-03-20
  • 通讯作者: 周黎安 E-mail:zhoula@gsm.pku.edu.cn

“Bureaucratic & Economic Markets” and China's Growth Story

ZHOU Li   

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
  • Online:2018-03-20 Published:2018-03-20

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摘要：

本文运用和拓展了“官场+市场”理论，重新解析中国独具特色的经济增长机制以及政府与市场的互动模式。地方官员之间围绕着辖区经济发展的官场竞争嵌入在不同辖区企业之间的市场竞争之中，而辖区企业参与的市场竞争又嵌入在官场竞争之中。作为一种分析框架，“官场+市场”的理论贡献在于揭示了政府与市场的良性互动、政企的有效合作必备的三个条件，即内部的政治激励（“把事做对”）、外部的市场约束（“防止做坏事”）和必要的信息反馈（“做对的事”）。中国“官场+市场”的增长模式在总体上提供了这三个关键条件，在最积极的意义上实现了辖区内政治企业家与民间企业家精神的结合，政治精英与经济精英的结合，中国历史悠久的官僚政治传统与西方国家市场经济传统的结合，为我们揭示中国增长之谜开辟了新的视角。

关键词: 市场竞争, 官场竞争, 政企合作, 产业政策

Abstract:

This paper extends the theory of "bureaucratic & economic markets" and reinterprets the unique growth mechanism of the Chinese economy and the intriguing interaction between government and market. In China we observe an interesting "mutual embededness" of bureaucratic markets for local officials and economic markets for firms across jurisdictions:local leaders compete in bureaucratic markets where their promotion is closely linked with economic performance of firms in their jurisdictions, and in the meantime, firms compete in economic markets and receive critical support for their respective jurisdictional governments. The performance-based bureaucratic competition motivates local leaders to help local firms grow and win the economic competition, and the interregional mobility of physical and human capital limits the tendency of local leaders to predate or grab local firms. The economic performance of firms in market competition provides feedback and is an ultimate test of the effectiveness of government-business cooperation and local industrial policies. The extended theory of "bureaucratic & economic markets" contributes to the existing literature by highlighting three critical preconditions for effective government-market cooperation:providing political incentives to ensure bureaucrats "do things in the right way", external market constraints to "prevent bureaucrats from doing evil", and necessary information feedback to guide bureaucrats to "do the right thing". For any country or region, its ability to satisfy these three conditions becomes critical for fostering an effective interaction between government and market and sustaining economic growth. In the past decades China has shaped a growth model based on the interplay of "bureaucratic & economic markets" which generally satisfied the three preconditions and laid the institutional foundation for China's economic miracle. This dual-markets model has resulted in friendly handshaking between political and private entrepreneurs, productive cooperation between political and economic elites, and a remarkable combination of China's time-honored heritage of strong bureaucracy with the western tradition of market economy. The dual-markets model also has its limitations, especially in the sphere of provision of public services, which exactly explains various "government failures" associated with China's high economic growth in the past 40 years.

Key words: bureaucratic competition, market competition, government-business cooperation, industrial policy