社会杂志 ›› 2026, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (3): 1-31.

• 专题一：治理理论研究 •    下一篇

治理不可能三角

周黎安()   

  • 出版日期:2026-05-20 发布日期:2026-07-24
  • 作者简介:

    周黎安  北京大学光华管理学院, E-mail:

    ZHOU Li-An, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, E-mail:

Governance Impossibility Triangle

Li-An ZHOU()   

  • Online:2026-05-20 Published:2026-07-24

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摘要：

本研究在行政发包制研究的基础上，丰富和发展了“治理不可能三角”这一中层理论，指出在任何一个层级化委托—代理结构中，刚性治理目标、刚性预算配置与刚性规则约束三者都不可能同时成立，组织必须在三者之间进行结构性取舍。本文据此重构了行政发包制、韦伯式理性科层制与现代公司治理三种典型形态的比较逻辑，并提出一组可检验命题用以解释非正式制度扩张、选择性执行、运动式治理、模糊发包、组织变形等众多治理现象的内生机制。本文进一步分析了“不可能三角”成立的隐含条件（技术、组织吸纳能力、代理人行为、风险外化与合法性资源）及其可能的突破路径（技术进步、超常动员与组织重构），并从事前与事后不确定性管理的视角揭示了行政发包制与韦伯式理性科层制的根本差异，并指出，在目标刚性、资源约束、信息分散、风险外溢等结构条件下，中国国家治理形成了以科层制为“底盘”、发包机制为“发动机”、外部“承包器”为补充的混合制度结构，从而在不可能条件中维持治理的可行性与连续性。

关键词: 治理不可能三角, 行政发包制, 理性科层制, 现代公司治理, 不确定性管理

Abstract:

Building on the analysis of administrative subcontracting, this paper develops the governance impossibility triangle as a mid-range theoretical framework. It argues that within any hierarchical principal-agent structure, three constraints-rigid performance targets, fixed resource constraints, and strict rule enforcement-cannot be simultaneously maximized. Organizations must therefore make structural trade-offs among these three elements. Based on this insight, the paper reinterprets three ideal-typical governance forms-administrative subcontracting, Weberian bureaucracy, and modern corporate governance-as distinct equilibria under different constraint combinations. It further derives a set of testable propositions to explain endogenous phenomena such as the expansion of informal institutions, selective implementation, campaign-style governance, ambiguous subcontracting, and organizational distortion. The paper also examines the implicit conditions under which the triangle holds-including technological limits, organizational absorption capacity, agent behavior, risk externalization, and legitimacy resources-and identifies potential pathways for reconfiguration, such as technological innovation, extraordinary mobilization, and organizational restructuring. By distinguishing between ex ante and ex post uncertainty management, it reveals a fundamental divide between bureaucratic and subcontracting logics. Finally, the paper argues that China's governance system, under conditions of rigid targets, resource constraints, dispersed information, and high risk externalities, has evolved into a hybrid structure: bureaucracy as the institutional base, subcontracting as the operational engine, and externalized organizational forms as complementary absorbers. This configuration enables governance to remain viable under structurally impossible conditions.

Key words: Governance Impossibility Triangle, Administrative Subcontract, Rational Bureaucracy, modern corporate governance, uncertainty management