社会杂志 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (3): 110-139.

• 专题:集体行动研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

组织动员、行动策略与机会结构——业主集体行动结果的影响因素分析

盛智明   

  1. 上海大学社会学院
  • 出版日期:2016-05-20 发布日期:2016-05-20
  • 通讯作者: 盛智明 上海大学社会学院 E-mail:sheng@shu.edu.cn E-mail:sheng@shu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    本文受国家社会科学社科基金青年项目"城市治理模式对社区纠纷和业主行动的影响研究"(14CSH065)和上海高校青年教师培养资助计划(ZZSD15061)的资助。

Organizational Mobilization, Action Strategy, and Opportunity Structure: Analysis on Factors Affecting the Result of Homeowners' Collective Action

SHENG Zhiming   

  1. School of Sociology and Political Science, Shanghai University
  • Online:2016-05-20 Published:2016-05-20
  • Supported by:

    This research is supported by the Youth Project of National Social Science Foundation “The Research on the Effect of City Governance Mode on Community Disputes and Homeowners'Actions”(14CSH065)and Shanghai Training and Support Plan for University Youth Teachers(ZZSD15061).

摘要:

本文从组织动员、行动策略和机会结构三个维度出发,基于发生在1999-2012年的中国191个业主维权案例,系统考察了纠纷类型、参与人数、维权方式、业主组织和政府反应五个因素对业主集体维权结果的影响。研究发现,在涉及政府部门的行政型纠纷和混合型纠纷中,业主不易维权成功;动员一定数量的业主有助于集体维权成功,但并不意味着动员人数越多,成功可能性越大;不同维权方式及其组合会影响维权结果,非制度化的激进行为并不利于业主实现其利益诉求;真正代表业主利益且能有效运作的业主组织可以显著提高业主维权成功的可能性;政府的行政失当行为(包括不当干预和行政不作为)大大增加了业主维权的难度。这些发现在一定程度上揭示了当前中国强国家-弱社会的现状。

关键词: 组织动员, 行动策略, 机会结构, 业主集体行动, 物业纠纷

Abstract:

In community disputes, why some homeowners' collective actions can success, while others fail? Based on three theoretical dimensions which consist of organizational mobilization, action strategy and opportunity structure, this study systematically examines the effect of five factors on the result of homeowners' collective action by analyzing data collected from 191 cases of homeowners' rights protection activities happened in China between 1999 and 2012. These factors include type of dispute, number of participants, rights-defending method, homeowner organization, and government response. Among them, the homeowner organization and the number of participants reflect homeowners' capability of organizing and mobilizing themselves.The rights-defending method is an important part of homeowners' action strategy. The type of dispute and the government response indicate the opportunity and constrain faced by homeowners. The results show that:(1) Inadministrative disputes and mixed disputes, homeowners are less likely to successfully protect their interests. (2) Mobilizing certain number of participants is conducive for homeowners to achieve a satisfactory result in their collective protest, but it does not mean that the more participants mobilized, the more likely they will succeed. For the cases which relate toimportant public affairs of community, mobilizing enoughhomeowners to reach the necessary quorum of statutory requirement for public decision making is the necessary condition tosuccessfully resolve homeowners' problems.(3) Different kinds of rights protection methods and their combinations can influence the result of homeowners' rights-defending activity. The non-institutionalized and radical actions are not helpful for homeowners to realize their interest claims. In most situations, homeowners, as the moderate middle class, would resort to institutionalized and rational way to protect their interests;(4) A well-functioned homeowners' organization which truly represents the interests of homeowners can significantly increase the success rate of homeowners' collective action. (5) The government maladministration (that is the improper intervention and administrative nonfeasance) severely hinder homeowners from successfully protecting their legitimate rights and interests. It would be hard for homeowners' organization to play their positive role when they encounter the improper reaction of state power. This is the institutional obstacle in homeowners' rights-defending action. These findings, to certainextent, reveal the reality of strong state and weak society in contemporary China.

Key words: property dispute, homeowners' collective action, action strategy, organizational mobilization, opportunity structure