社会杂志 ›› 2017, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (3): 67-84.

• 专题:风险与国家治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

代理人困境与国家治理:兼评“风险论”

蔡永顺   

  1. 香港科技大学社会科学部
  • 出版日期:2017-05-20 发布日期:2017-05-20
  • 通讯作者: 蔡永顺 E-mail:socai@ust.hk

The Agency Problem and Governance: Comments on the Risk-Minimizing Theory

CAI Yongshun   

  1. CAI Yongshun, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
  • Online:2017-05-20 Published:2017-05-20

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摘要：

向下分权是治理幅员辽阔之国家的必然选择。在中央集权体制下，统治者采取向下分权的时候也会面临治理风险，即如果地方政府取得足够的资源和权力，它们可能对最高统治者构成威胁。曹正汉在考察中国古代统治体制演变时，提出郡县制是帝王减少代理人风险的制度安排，因为郡县制具有避免让单一地方政府强大到可以挑战帝王权威的作用。本文探讨向下分权对于集权体制政治稳定的影响。分权在为最高统治者减少代理人风险的同时，也为统治者创造了规避责难的空间。但向下分权在减少代理人风险的同时，也给统治者造成了多重代理人问题。具体而言，代理人如果没有受到有效约束，他们不但会削弱国家能力，还可能损害政权的合法性，引发社会风险。如何约束代理人始终是最高统治者面临的难题。

关键词: 集权, 郡县制, 代理人, 分权, 风险

Abstract:

The inevitable choice for the ruler who wants to govern a vast territory is decentralization. But a ruler faces risks when delegating power because local governments, or their agents, may challenge a ruler when they gain enough resources and power. Therefore, decentralization constitutes a problemfor the ruler of delegating power to different agents. In his analysis of the evolution of the governance structure in ancient China, Cao Zhenghan proposes that the jun-xian system is an effective arrangement to solve the problem of delegates. This system prevents the rise of a powerful local government that is able to challenge the ruler while still ensuring that local delegates perform the duties assigned by the ruler. But an effective jun-xian system has to meet a series of conditions. Cao's “risk-minimizing” theory explains the political logic of decentralization in ancient China, but it does not examine other issues arising from decentralization. This paper explores how decentralization may affect the political stability of authoritarian rule. It suggests that decentralization not only reduces risk for the ruler, but also creates immunity from blame and recrimination. But decentralization can also create a series of problems for the ruler. First, delegates who are not effectively constrained weaken state capacity. When self-serving agents pursue their personal interests at the expense of the ruler and the people, they undermine the ruler's policy choices. Second, the self-serving behavior of some delegates can also undermine regime legitimacy and give rise to risks. Therefore, a top ruler faces the constant issue of how to solve the problem of delegating power.

Key words: decentralization, jun-xian system, centralization, risk, agency