代理人困境与国家治理:兼评“风险论”

Abstract

Abstract:

The inevitable choice for the ruler who wants to govern a vast territory is decentralization. But a ruler faces risks when delegating power because local governments, or their agents, may challenge a ruler when they gain enough resources and power. Therefore, decentralization constitutes a problemfor the ruler of delegating power to different agents. In his analysis of the evolution of the governance structure in ancient China, Cao Zhenghan proposes that the jun-xian system is an effective arrangement to solve the problem of delegates. This system prevents the rise of a powerful local government that is able to challenge the ruler while still ensuring that local delegates perform the duties assigned by the ruler. But an effective jun-xian system has to meet a series of conditions. Cao's “risk-minimizing” theory explains the political logic of decentralization in ancient China, but it does not examine other issues arising from decentralization. This paper explores how decentralization may affect the political stability of authoritarian rule. It suggests that decentralization not only reduces risk for the ruler, but also creates immunity from blame and recrimination. But decentralization can also create a series of problems for the ruler. First, delegates who are not effectively constrained weaken state capacity. When self-serving agents pursue their personal interests at the expense of the ruler and the people, they undermine the ruler's policy choices. Second, the self-serving behavior of some delegates can also undermine regime legitimacy and give rise to risks. Therefore, a top ruler faces the constant issue of how to solve the problem of delegating power.

Key words: decentralization, jun-xian system, centralization, risk, agency

CAI Yongshun. The Agency Problem and Governance: Comments on the Risk-Minimizing Theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 2017, 37(3): 67-84.

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The Agency Problem and Governance: Comments on the Risk-Minimizing Theory

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