社会杂志 ›› 2017, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (3): 46-66.

• 专题:风险与国家治理 • 上一篇    下一篇

历史的理论研究路径和理论模型——对《中国的集权与分权:“风险论”与历史证据》一文的几点评论

刘世定   

  1. 北京大学中国社会与发展研究中心
  • 出版日期:2017-05-20 发布日期:2017-05-20
  • 通讯作者: 刘世定 E-mail:liushd@pku.edu.cn

The Theoretical Research Approach to History and the Theoretical Model

LIU Shiding   

  1. the Center for Sociological Research and Development Studies of China, Peking University
  • Online:2017-05-20 Published:2017-05-20

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摘要：

本文强调，在研究集权和分权这一反复出现且类型多样的历史现象时，建构适度抽象、概念和逻辑明晰的理论模型以助分析是有效的。本文指出，将“风险论”和“效率论”对立起来有欠妥当，“风险论”就是一种效率指向的理论，重要的是区分何种治理、何种效率、谁之效率。沿着这一思路，本文建构了分析统治者风险治理效率和日常行政效率关系的模型，指出当一种制度赋予统治者以统治风险最小化的行为特性时，其日常行政治理效率的最大边界在哪里；建构了统治风险治理效率下的集权和分权选择模型，并考察过度集权与过度分权的概念；讨论了效率区分在理解中国历史中非均衡割据现象方面的意义。本文通过理论模型的建构，考察了统治者收放权边界内外运作的差异。

Abstract:

Reviewing Professor Cao Zhenghan's research, this article develops a theoretical model to explain the history of state centralization and decentralization in China, and emphasizes that conceptual and logical analysis is helpful to understand this kind of organizational phenomena. We comment that it is not appropriate to place risk theory and efficiency theory in opposition; rather, it is much more necessary to distinguish the kind of governance, efficiency, and efficient individuals. This paper analyzes the relationship between the efficiency of governance with political risks and the efficiency of daily administration, and discusses the maximum efficiency of daily administrative governance, and the behavioral choices if political risks are minimized. It examines the concepts of over-centralization and over-decentralization, and emphasizes the significance of efficiency distinction in understanding the phenomenon of non-equilibrium separatism in Chinese history. This paper also points out that it is necessary to illustrate the governances both within and beyond the border of the ruler's power. Under certain conditions the decentralization will lead to further decentralization; centralization will lead to further centralization.